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1. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction in all civil causes
of admiralty jurisdiction and have it exclusive of the courts of the several
States, except as to the common law remedy. Ashbrook vs. The Golden
Gate, . . . . . 148
2. Alien given by the general maritime law is a vested right, and the
legislature of a State can pass no law to impair it. Ibid.
3. A material-man who has a lien under the general maritime law of the
United States has a right to enforce that lien in the Federal courts, and
State laws or proceedings under them cannot deprive him of that right.
Ibid.
. INDEX.
4. A dissenting- part owner is entitled to a stipulation to secure his inte-
rest in case of a loss ba a voyage undertaken against his wishes. Tunno
et al. vs. The Betsina, . . .. . . 406
5. The court of admiralty will not order an account. as a separate and
independent mode of relief, but only as incident to other matter of which
it has admitted cognizance. Ibid.
6. In the management of a vessel the opinion of the majority shall pre-
vail, unless it forbids its employment, in which case it yields to the mi-
nority who desire its employment, because the public interest must be
protected in securing employment to the vessel. Ibid.
7. The court of admiralty has an admitted jurisdiction to secure the
value of the dissentient minority's interest, in case of a disagreement
among part owners in the employment of the vessel. Ibid.
8. The Admiralty has jurisdiction over marine torts, which may be de-
fined to be unlawful acts, injurious to others, independent of contract,
happening or being committed upon the sea or tide-water. The Philadel-
phia and Havre De Grace Steam Tow-Boat Company vs. The Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, - - - 280
9. A steam-tug, regularly licensed under the Acts of Congress, plying
between ports in different States, is within the provision of the constitution
as to the regulation of commerce, and the observance of the special State
laws regulating Sunday labor, is not compulsory upon such steam-tug;
but it would have been otherwise had the tug been engaged in towing
vessels between ports of the same State. Ibid.
10. Where the respondents had contracted with certain parties for the
building of a bridge across the Susquehanna river, and the bridge con-
tractors, at the request and for the convenience of the respondents' engi-
neers, had driven in the bed of the river a "sight-pile," upon which a
steam tug-boat run, without fault on her part, and was thereby much
damaged, held, that the negligence of the contractors and engineers, in not
removing the "sight-pile," was the negligence of the respondents, the
relation of master and servant being established by the facts. Ibid.
AGENT.
See Master and Servant.
AGREEMENT.
1. A person may make an agreement, which will bind him legally, to
make a particular disposition of his property by last will. Johnson vs.
Hubbell et al, - - - 177
2. A court of equity will decree the specific performance of such an
agreement upon the principles which govern the court, in the exercise of
this branch of its jurisdiction. Ibid.
3. Although the agreement is by parol, if there is a part performance of
such a character as, upon the principles recognized by the court, will take
a parol agreement out of the statute of frauds, then there is nothing
peculiar about an agreement of this kind to exclude it from the operation
of those principles. Ibid.
4. If one party to a parol agreement has wholly or partially performed
it on his part, so that its non-fulfilment by the other party is a fraud, the
court will compel a performance. Ibid.
5. Although a party has a right to the protection of the court, if that
protection cannot be given him without invading the rights of innocent










1. Two partners cannot make an assignment of all the partnership pro-
perty and effects of an insolvent firm, to a trustee with preferences, after
the third partner has refused to secure any one of the creditors in prefe-
rence to others, or to distinguish between them, and in his absence, not
out of the country, but where he might be again consulted without unne-
cessary delay. Henry C. 13owen vs. Henry 0. Clark and others, - 203
2. The third partner repudiated the assignment, and be, with the aid of
his co-partners and a mortgagee of a portion, of his property, who was also
a preferred creditor, took the assigned property from the assignee, who
refused to sue at law for the property, or its value, unless indemnified
against costs and expenses. leld, that a court'of equity should not enter-
tain a bill against all the partners and the mortgagee, to restore the origi-
nal property to the assignee's firm% on account, at the suit of two of the
preferred creditors, one of whom had been refused a preference by the
non-assigning partner. Ibid.
8. When the principal assigning partner was laboring under the imme-
diate effects of intoxication, which he had just slept off, at the time of the
execution of the assignment, with the full knowledge of the agent of the
plaintiff who procured the assignment, and of the assignee; if the circum-
stance is not sufficient.to fix upon the transaction the imputation of fraud,
it is suspicious, and should not be favored in a court of equity. Ibid.
4. A mortgage of a retail store, with possession and a power of dispo-
sition reserved to the mortgagor, either in the mortgage or in any other
manner, is to be considered a means of hindering or delaying creditors,
and void as against executions or attachments. But a court of equity will
not entertain a bill, at the suit of preference creditors under an assignment,
to avoid a mortgage on this ground against the mortgagors and the mort-
gagee, who is also a preferred creditor equal with the plaintiffs, unless
there is a deficit of assets, and payment of the debt secured by the mort-
gage is claimed in full. Ibid.
5. A partial assignment of a debt, not assented to by the debtor, will
not bind the latter at law or in equity, nor deprive him of the right to pay
the whole to the assignor; even after notice. Fairgricves vs. The Lehigh
Navigation Company, . . .. . 161
6. The salary of a clerk is not assignable before it is earned, in whole
or in part. Ibid.
7. Whether a debtor who has made a fraudulent conveyance can after-
wards assign the property so conveyed, to be applied to the payment of "
his debts, or not? Hooper, Son & Co. vs. Rosenthal, - - - -46
8. Is there any difference between the conveyance of such property to
others in trust for the payment of debts, and a conveyance directly to the
creditors themselves? Ibid.
9. A conveyance of property of every kind whatsoever in trust for the
payment of debts will include property previously conveyed to defraud
creditors, unless it is held adversely by the fraudulent vendee. Ibid.
10. The British doctrine with regard to assignments'for the benefit of
creditors and the American doctrine discussed. Ibid.
ATTACHMENT.














- 1. A merchant loaded a Spanish vessel at C., chartered to deliver
the cargo in London. The vessel put into an intermediate port disa-
bled; whereupon the captain, without any communication with the nier-
chant or his agents at that port, though aware of their existence, entered
into a charter party with the captain of another vessel to take the cargo
to its destination, which the charter party described to be 470 tons, the
captain of the disabled vessel agreeing to load the other and pay freight at
a rate per ton exceeding the rate of freight for which the first vessel was
chartered. The vessel was loaded, and a bill of lading in accordance with
the terms of the charter party was signed by the captain of the second
vessel. On the arrival of the cargo at its destination it was discovered to
be only 844 tons, and the merchant offered to pay freight on that amount
at the rate agreed on by the charter party, which having been refused,
he paid for 470 tons inder protest, and brought an action for money had
and received to recover the difference :-Held,
1. First, that the merchant was entitled to recover.
2. Secondly, that the master had no authority to bind the merchant to
pay the freight mentioned in the bill of lading.
3. Thirdly, that the merchant was not liable in an action upon the char-
ter party for the neglect to provide a full cargo.
4. Fourthly, that the representation in the charter party that the cargo
amounted to 470 tons did not amount to a warranty.
5. Fifthly, supposing that representation had been a false and fraud-
ulent one, the merchant would not be accountable for it. Gibbs and
others vs. Gray and others-Gray and others vs. Gibbs and others. - 738
BOUNDARY OF LANDS.
Lands bounded on Lake Champlain extend to the edge of the water
at low water mark. The same rule applied, in this case, to lands near the
lake bounded on a creek emptying into, and the waters of which ordina-
rily maintain the same level, and rise and fall with those of the lake;
there being no claim made that the boundary should extend to the centre
of the creek. Judson B. Fletcher vs. Samuel Phelps and Benajah Phelps. 677
CARE.
See Master and Servant.
CARRIERS.
1. Where A makes a contract in the form of a bill of lading, in which
B, the ship-owner, undertakes to send forward A's goods by a particular
ship at a particular time, the shipper is entitled to have the very contract
made fulfilled, and if B, the ship-owner, substitutes another ship instead
of the one stipulated for, he has substituted different risks, and will be
INDEX. 765
held as an insurer against all loss from whatsoever cause. zin vs. The
Liverpool and Philadelphia Steamship Company. - - 459
2. The rule by which damages are to be assessed against a carrier,
where the shipper's goods are lost through his ignorance or want of care
and skill, is their net value at the port of delivery. The carrier is not
liable for any speculation or possible profits, which the ownei: might have
anticipated in his peculiar business. rbid.
CASES AFFIRMED.
Barto vs. Himrod, 4 Seld. 488.
See Clark vs. Rochester, - . . . . 289
Bayard vs. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Ch. 450.
See Hooper vs. Rosenthal, - .. 46
Bayard vs. Shunk, I Watts and Serg. 95.
See McIntire vs. Kennedy, - - - - 423
Dunlap vs. Bournouville, 26Penn. St. Rep. 72.
See Leech vs. Shantz, - - -. 620
McClure vs. Young, 2 Watts and Serg. 147.
See Ibid, -- - - 620
CESTUI QUE TRUST.
1. Where one W., the defendant, and one MI., the complainant, entered
into a contract and agreement whereby the said W. became the agent and
trustee of the said M., to sell his interest in the steamboat Jewess, under
certain terms and upon certain stipulations; and where, in direct violation
of the terms of the contract, co-operating and conspiring with one H.,
who also owned a moiety of the steamboat, the said W. sold to R., his
partner, the interest of his cestui qne trust, and advanced part of the pur-
chase money, the sale being made at a lower price than had been previ-
ously offered, and within thirty days of the sale, took, by the Custom
House documents, title and possession to himself of a certain interest in
the said steamboat, the sale was held void, as being in violation of the
general and universally established doctrine, that trustees are incapable of
purchasiug trust property themselves. Montgomery vs. Whittington,
Ho6per, Ricketts and Murphy. 4- 3
2. The general doctrine of the relations between cestuis que trust and
trustees discussed. Ibid.
3. The destui que trust is entitled to the full value of the property at
the time of the sale, as damages, if it is lost or not in a condition to be
returned. Ibid.
CHECK.
1. Where A, the debter, paid to B, the creditor, two cheeks, one his own,
and one that of a third party, the mere taking of the checks for a, pre-
existing debt, and without any express agreement that they should be pay-
ment, does not make them payment; and A is liable to B for the second
check, if worthless or unpaid, although it is the check of a stranger and
A's name does not appear upon it. McIntyre vs. Kennedy, Childs & Co. 433
2. It is a general rule that if one indebted to another by simple contract
gives his creditor a promissory note or check drawn: by hkself for the
same amount, without any new consideratiq, the check or note shall not
be deemed a satisfaction of the original debt, unless so intended and ac-
cepted by the parties. Rid.
3. Whether'a debtor pays out his note or check, or the note or check of
a third party, the creditor, in the bbsence of any special agreement, may
resort to his debtor if the check or note is unpaid. Rbid.
766 INDEX.
4. Wherea check-in the usual form, payable to bearer, is drawn by B.
on the E. Bank, and passes into the hands and ownership of the N. Bank,
the latter bank, the holder, cannot maintain an action in its own name
against the former bank, the drawee, the check never having been accepted
by the drawee, but its payment refused. Per HUNTINGTON, J.; ABBOTT,
J., dissenting. National Bank vs. Eliot Bank. - - - 711
5. But where the third party, seeking to enforce the contract, is particu-
larly designated in the contract, he may maintain an action in his own
name for a breach of the undertaking. Ibid.
6. The contract between a bank and its customer in deposits is in the
nature of a loan, and the relation that of debtor and creditor. Ibid.
7. A check, in order to avail the holder, must be presented, accepted,
and charged. Ibid.
CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
See The Madison and Indiana Railroad vs. Whiteneck, 214
CLAIMS.
1. The act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1797, provides, that in a
suit by the United States to recover a balance due on the books of the
Treasury Department, the defendant cannot give in evidence as a set-off, a
claim against the government, which has not previously been presentedto,
and disallowed by the proper accounting officer, without proving that it was
not before in his power to produce the voucher for such claim, and that he
was prevented from exhibiting it, "by absence from the United States, or
some unavoidable accident." The United States vs. Charles K. Smith. 268
2. The rejection of an account or claim against the United States, by an
accounting officer of the government, authorized by a special act of Con-
gre-s to adjust the shme on equitable principles, does not preclude the de-
fendant, when sued, from setting up such rejected claim or account, as a
set-off. Ibid.
3. There is no authority, either in the executive or judicial department
of the government, to allow a claim against the United States, which is
prohibited by law. Ibid.
4. The legislation of Congress prohibits any extra compensation to an
officer, for services performed, properly pertaining bylaw, to his office.
Ibid.
5. The defendant, as Secretary of Minnesota Territory, having a fixed
salary as such, was not entitled to claim in addition thereto, the salary of
governor, during the absence of that officer; as the act organizing the
Territory made it the duty of the secretary, "in case of the death, re-
moval, resignation, or necessary absence of the governor," to discharge
the duties of that office, without any provision for an increase of compen-
sation to the secretary. Ibid.
6. The proviso in the 2d section of the act of September 30, 1850,
expressly prohibits the allowance of double salaries in all cases. Ibid.
7. The act organizing the Territory of Minnesota, made the Secretary
the disbursing officer of the territorial government, and he cannot claim a
commission on such disbursements. Ibid.
8. Where an officer, with a salary payable quarterly, is appointed for
four years, "unless sooner removed by the President," and a removal is
made during & current quarter, he is not entitled to his salary to the end
of the quarter. Ibid.
9. By the organic act of Minnesota Territory, the general government
beeame pledged to defray "the expenses of the legislative assembly, the
printing of the laws, and other incidental expenses ;" and the defendant
is entitled to a credit for services rendered, or expenditures made, -within
the fair scope and meaning of these terms, so far as they did not pertain
to the office of secretary of the territory; but the words "other incidental
INDEX.
expenses," must be restricted to such expenses as were incidental to the
legislative assembly and the printing of the laws. Dfid.
10. The 2d section of the act of 29th of August, 1842, which applies
to territories then, or afterwards to be organized, provides that no act of
the legislature of a Territory shall be deemed of sufficient authority for a
payment by the national treasury, and requires proper vouchers and proof
of the same, to be exhibited to the accounting officers of the proper de-
partment. Ibid.
11. In a judicial case involving the accounts of a former secretary of a
territory, in which credits are claimed, which have been rejected by the'
treasury department, the fact that such credits have not been embraced in
the estimate required by the organic act of the territory to be previously
made by the secretary of the treasury, does not preclude their allowance
by a jury, if not objectionable on other grounds. Aid.
COLLISION.
1. When two vessels are approaching each other, and the character and
course of either cannot be determined by the watch on board, such vessel
should be stopped, or slowed, until the course of the approaching vessel be
ascertained, whether it be a sail or a steam vessel Eben B. Ward, et at,
vs. Philo Chamberlain, et al. - -. - - - 330
2. Some of the rules of the Trinity masters, intended to apply in navi-
gating a river, when applied to the open sea, are more likely to produce
collisions than to avoid them. Ibid.
3. In certain conditions, one vessel is to keep her course, and the other
to avoid her; how can a concurrence of judgment as to their position, by
their respective inasters, be expected, so as to comply with the rule of
right, when the wind is fresh? Uncertainty in thisrespect produces many
collisions. -Jbid.
4. All the rules of navigation should be simple and easily under-
stood. Ibid.
5. Complicated rules are often misunderstood, and more frequently
applied to facts supposed, which have no existence. Ibid.
6. So far as my limited experience on this subject enablis me to speak,
the rules of navigatron recognized, instead of insuring safety, have greatly
increased the number of collisions. Per McLean, J. -Ad.
t. If the rule were, that all vessels meeting each other should turn to
the right, all would understand it, and collisions would be avoided. Each
vessel,'in such case, would know the course of the other; and if either
could not turn as directed, would not run in the path of the other. I am
aware thet this is too simple and too easily understood for technical law-
yers, on the bench or at the. bar. It is the rule on every turnpike
road, and such maxims are always founded on common sense. Per
McLean, J. Jl 2
8. When fault may be attributed to two vessels, the damages are divided,
and not apportioned according to the degree of fault. Ibid.
COMPROMISE.
1. The law will permit a compromise of any offence though made the
subject of a criminal prosecution, for which offence the injured party might
recover damages-in an action, but if the offence is of a public naturej no
agreement can be valid that is founded on the consideration of stifling a
prosecution for it. Bowen & McNamee v8. Addison Buck and David
Warren. .. . . . 420
2. Therefore, where the plaintiff's agent induced the giving of the note
on which this action is brought by representing that a prosecution had
been instituted, and byagreeing to settle and stop that prosecution, the use
made of this alleged proposition to compel the giving of the note, renders





1. Where the city of Rochester had become subscribers to the capital
stock of a railroad, under a special act of Assembly, held, that the contract
was void, as being in violation of the Constitution of New York, the rights
of eminent domain and taxation considered. Freeman Clarke vs. the.city
of Rochester, - - - 289
2. The power to tax property in aid of a private corporation, or for the
purchase of its stock, is not among the ordinary powers of a municipal
government, and requires special legislation to confer it, and this legisla-
tion is, in New York, prohibited by the constitution. Per Allen, J. Ibid.
8. A State Legislature, in the absence of any express constitutional
authority, has no power to sell, surrender, alienate, or abridge any of the
rights of sovereignty, such as the right of taxation, so as to bind future
legislatures ; and any contract to that effect is void. Henry S. Mott et al,
Canal Commissioners, zs. the Pennsylvania Railroad Company et al., 623
4. So much of the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, passed May
16, 1857, authorizing the sale of the Main Line of the Public Improvements
of that State as provides "that if the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
shall become the purchaser, they shall pay, in addition to the purchase
money at which it (the Main Line) may be struck down, the sum of
$1,600,000, in consideration whereof the said Railroad Company and the
Harrisburg Railroad Company shall be discharged by the Commonwealth
forever" from the payment of all tonnage taxes, and all other taxes what-
ever, "except for school, city, county, borough and township purposes,"
declared unconstitutional and void, and an injunction granted to prevent
the same from forming part of the terms of the sale. Ibid.
5. The act in question provided that the sale should be made by the
Governor; held, that as this was not part of his official duty as the Execu-
tive of the State, but merely ministerial, the injunction might issue against
him. Ibid.
6. The holders of the State loan, whether or not having a specified lien
on the tolls of the public works, have no right to object to a sale thereof
by the State. Ibid.
7. The courts cannot annul an act of the Legislature simply because it
violates the fundamental principle of correct legislation, but may because it
Tiolates the fundamental principles of the Constitution. Hudson and Ind.
R. R. Co. vs. Whiteneck, -.- - 214
8. A law may be constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part,
hence, a law which enacts that railroads shall fence, as to that provision
is a reasonable regulation, but where it inflicts a penalty upon an appeal,
it is unconstitutional and void. Ibid.
9. The present constitution of New Jersey limits the powers of the Legis-
lature, and separates them from those of the judiciary, and adopts the
prohibitions of the Constitution of the United States against laws impair-
ing the obligation of contracts, and further prohibits the depriving a party
of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract
was made. Hence, where the Legislature passed an act for the relief of
the creditors of a manufacturing corporation, providing that certain per-
sons should be authorized to sell all property mortgaged for the payment
of bonds, at public sale to the highest bidder, free from all incumbrances,
and, after paying certain expenses and costs, to distribute the proceeds to
the corporation's creditors according to the priority of their several liens,
it was held that such legislation was unconstitutional by reason of its im-
pairing the obligation of the contract between the mortgagors and the
INDEX. - 769
mortgagees, and depriving the mortgagees of a remedy 'which existed at
the time the contract was made. John M. Martin vs. the Somerville Water
Power Company, - - - 400
CONTRACT.






















1. The common.law of England, as changed and modified by our statutes,
is part and parcel of the law of Alabama, so far as applicable to her
institutions and government. Barlowvs. Lambert, - 171
2. Evidence of a local custom is admissible, to supply details in a con-
tract, either oral or written,.as to which the contract itself is silent; or to
show that provincialism, and technicalities of science and commerce, have
acquired a known, fixed, and definite meaning, different from their ordi-
nary import; or where such technicalities, unexplained, are susceptible of
two or more reasonable constructions; but it cannot he received to contra-
vene any positive requirement of the law, any principle of public policy,
or an express contract, whether oral or written, nor to give to plain and
unambiguous words -or phrases a meaning different from their natural
import; and it is, therefore, inadmissible to show that a stipulation in a
contract of hiring, that the hirer was to "lose the negro's lost time,"
"related to time lost by sickness or running away, and not to time lost in
consequence of the negro's death." Ibid.
8. If evidence is offered as a whole, when a portion of it is illegal, the
court may, on objection, exclude the whole of it. Ibid.
4. When a party calls for a part that was said at an interview of the
parties, it does not follow that the other party may show all that was said.
49
770 INDEX.
He may show so much of the conversation as made a part of the negotia-
tions, or a part of the res gestae. Isaac H. Brown vs. Jacob Gold-
smith et al. . . .. . . 304
5. The court will not grant a new trial, even if the ruling of the judge
was wrong, if upon the whole case justice has been done. Ibid.
6. The character of the deceased as a violent, turbulent, blood-thirsty
man, when it qualifies, explains, and gives point and meaning to his con-
duct, and tends to produce in the mind of the slayer a reasonable belief
of imminent danger, is admissible evidence for the defendant; and there
are cases, also, in which it may be looked to, in determining the amountof provocation, and thus fixing the degree of the homicide; but the
evidence in this case does not justify its admission on either of these
grounds. Franklin vs. the State, - . . . . 722
7. The violent character of the deceased cannot be established by proof
of isolated facts. Alid.
8. T. & M., brokers, employed by H., sold on his account to D., M. &
Co., who were also brokers, ten tons of linseed oil. On the 14th of August,
1855, the following sold note was sent by T. & M. to H.
"Sold to Dale, Morgan & Co., for account of Mr. Charles Humfrey,
ten tons of linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at, &c., (stating theterms.)
t -"THOMAs & MoonE, Brokers.
44 Quarter per cent. brokerage to D., M. & Co., and a half to us."
On the same day the following bought note was sent by D., M. & Co. to
V. & M:
"Sold this day, for Messrs. Thomas & Moore, to our principals, ten
tons of linseed oil, of merchantable quality, at, &c., (stating the sameterms.)
t DALE, MORGA, & Co., Brokers.
4 Quarter per cent. to D., M. & Co."
D. M. & Co., afterwards declined to accept the oil; and on the 28th
,of February, 1856, they informed H. of the name of their principal for
whom they bad purchased.
H. afterwards brought an action against D., M. & Co. for the price
of the oil, and at the trial parol evidence was admitted of a usage of trade
in the city of London, by which a broker making a contract was held per-
sonally liable as purchaser, if he did not at the time of the contract disclose
the name of his principal: Held, first, that there was clear evidence of a
contract of bargain and sale between the plaintiff as seller and the undis-
closed principal of the defendants. Humfrey vs. Dale, - - 1
9. Secondly that the evidence of the usage of trade, whether treated
as explaining the language of the written contract, or adding to it a tacitly
implied incident, -was properly admissible, and rendered the defendants
themselves liable under the contract. Abid.
10. The mother of a child born in wedlock, but begotten before, is not a
competent witness to prove that the child was not begotten by the man who
became her husband before its birth, in the absence of evidence of non-
access. Page vs. Dennison, . .. . 469
11. Where no evidence of non-access at the time of conception was
given, the declarations and acts of the husband and wife at the birth of the
child, and subsequently, were inadmissible to prove it illegitimate. Ibid.
[Per Lownm, J., dissenting-
1. In an inheritance case, where the claimant was begotten before and
born after marriage, the mother is a competent witness to prove that her
deceased husband, whose estate is the subject of the claim, was not the
father of the claimant. Ibid.
2. Where a child was begotten before and born after marriage, and at
the time of its birth both the mother and her husband denied that it was
INDEX. 771
his child, and it was, within a few days, sent away from his house and
reared by its maternal grandfather, and never admitted into the family of
the husband, nor reputed as his child, this is evidence, in an inheritance
case, that the child is illegitimate. Aid.]
3. Presumption on the subject of legitimacy examined historically and
on principle. Ibid.
12. A verbal agreement, to be effectual as a waiver, vdriation, or change
in the stipulations of a prior written contract between the parties, must
rest upon some new and distinct legal consideration, or must have been so
far executed and acted upon by the parties that a refusal to carry it out
would operate as a fraud upon one of the parties. Reuben H. Thurston
and Thomas Hays vs. Willi;im Ludwig, 606
13. On a motion for an injunction new matter set up by way of evidence in
the answer responsive to the bill, is to be deemed evidence in favor of the
defendant, as his sworn statement. James Tobin etal. vs. Robert Walkin-
shaw et at. . . . . 106
EQUITY.
See Agreement.
The fixed rule in equity is, that where the rights of a person not before
the court will be affected by the decree asked, the court will not make it;








An infant of the age of ten years was brought up on habeas corpus upon
the application of the mother who was surviving parent, the father, who
Was a marine, having died without appointing a guardian. The object of
the mother, who was a Roman Catholic, was to remove the infant from a
school under the Commissioners of the Royal Patriotic Fund, at which she
had placed her in 1855, and to have her educated in a Roman Catholic
school. Held, that the mother, as guardian for nurture, was entitled to the
custody of the person of the child; that the court could not examine the
infant as to her wishes or religious belief; that the mother was not bound
to educate her in the Protestant faith, nor had she lost her right over her
by committing her to the care of the Commissioners of the Royal Patriotic
Fund; and therefore the court was bound to order her to be delivered to
her mother. Reg. ye, Maria Clarke in re Alicia Race. - - 537
HABEAS CORPUS.
See Judgment.
1. A return to a writ of habeas corpus issued by a judge of the United
States, under the judiciary act of 1789, showing an imprisonment under
process, legal and valid on its face, is conclusive, and precludes further
inquiry into the cause of imprisonment. Ex Parte Sifford, marshal et al. 650
2. But the seventh section of the Act of Congress of the 2d. of March,
1883, expressly confers on a judge of the United States, the power to issue
the writ of habeas corpus, in all cases of imprisonment by any authority of
law, for any act done or omitted, in obedience to a law of the United
States; and where such imprisonment is for an alleged violation of a State
law, and by State authority, the judge or court issuing the habeas corpus
772 INDEX.
may inquire into the circumstances under which the alleged crime was
committed, with a view 'to the question whether the act complained of was
done or omitted in the proper discharge of official duty, and under the au-
thority of the United States: and, if it appears the act was so done or
omitted, the judge or court is authorized to discharge the party from such
imprisonment. Abid.
3. A marshal having a person in custody under lawful process, is bound
to retain such custody; and in so doing may use such force as is-necessary;
and in the proper use of such force, is not guilty of a crime against the
law of the State in-which the transaction occurred. Ibid.
' 4. A State judge has no jurisdiction to issue a habeas corpus for a pri-
soner in the lawful custody of an officer of the United States, with the
knowledge that he is so held; and if, on the return of the writ, it appears
the imprisoned party is held by an officer of the United States under legal
process, the jurisdiction of the State judge ceases, and all further proceed-
ings by him will be coram non judice. Rbid.
6. A sheriff, or other State officer, having a so-called writ of habeas
corpus, under the Ohio statute of 1856, and having knowledge that the pri-
soner named in the -writis in the custody of an officer of the United States,
under legal process, is under no obligation to serve or attempt to serve
such writ; and his return of the facts is a sufficient justification for not
serving it. Ibid.
6. A marshal, having custody of a prisoner under the authority of the
United States, is not bound to surrender such prisoner upon the demand of
a State officer, having a writ issued under the said Ohio statute, requiring
him to take the prisoner from such custody. Rid.
7. But if the habeas co-ru8 in the hands of the State officer is issued in
good faith, and is the well known writ of that name, requiring the officer
of the United States having the custody to bring the prisoner before the
judge or court issuing the writ, with the cause of the caption and detention,
it is the duty of such officer to obey such writ, as thereby he does not part
-with the custody of the prisoner; and such obedience will not be in con-
flict with his duty. ibid.
8. It is well settled by the adjudications, both of the courts of the Union
and te States, that, in case of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal or
court to which jurisdiction first attaches shall retain it; and neither has a















2. The record of a judgment obtained it a P'obate Clourt of Ohio ii a
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proceeding upon habeas corpus, is within the provisions.of the Act of Con-
gress of 26th May, 1790, providing for the authentication of records from
sister States. The State of Ohio ex rel. Walter Hinchman (a minor) by
his next friend, David H. Taylor vs. Morgan Hinchman. - - 424
2. In an action brought in Pennsylvania upon a judgment, certified under
said act as a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the courts
of this State are bound to take notice of the local laws of the sister State,
in the sam6 mannei as that court would do on a writ of error to the Su-
preme Court of this State. Ibid.
3. The act of Congress does not forbid the union of the offices of judge
and clerk in the same person; and it is no objection, therefore, to the at-
testation and certificate of a receord from a sister State, that they are both
given by the same person, where the laws of that sister State provide for
such union. Ibid.
4. Phe act of Congress does not preclude any other evidence of the au-
thenticity of a record of a sister State, which the courts of another State
may deem competent. Ibid.
5 Where the record itself shows that the person giving the certificate
must necessarily have been "the judge, chiefjustice, or presiding magis-
trate" of the court, it is not material or requisite to the validity of the au--
thentication of a record, under the act of Congress, that the language of
the certificate itself sh~ould exclude every other supposition. .bid.
JURISDICTION.
See Lien. Habeas Corpus.
1. A State may waive its right to exercise judicial authority over por-
tions of its territory. Commonwealth vs. Andrew B. Frazee, . - 167
2. By the agreement between the Statis of Pennsylvania and New Jersey
made in 1783, the juridical investigation and. determination of criminal
offences committed on tbe-river Delaware are specially provided for, and is
exclusive, no other court having cognizance of such offences except as pro-
vided by this agreement and subsequent Acts of Assembly. I-hid.
3. A defendant cannot be called upon to answer two different tribunals
for the same offence. Ibid.
JURY.
1. -The separation of the jury, for a short time, while considering of their
verdict, is a matter to be considered by the court on motion for a new
trial, but is not a proper ground for a motion in arrest of judgment.
Franklin vs. The State, . . . . . . 722
2. The right of trial by jsry may be waived, and such waiver will be





1. Where a shipper consigns goods to a factor and endorses and sends for.
ward bills of lading for them, and upon the faith of such bills of lading the
factor makes advances: Held, that the facts constituted such a symbolical
delivery of the goods to the factor or consignee as to amount to a construc-
tive possession, and that the factor's lien attached. Davies-& Aubin vs.
John Bradley & Co. - - - - - 232
2. A maritime lien on a vessel is paramount to a domestic lien, under a
statute of a State, of subsequent date. And if a judgment and sale take
INDEX.
place under a statutory lien, it will not displace or affect the prior lien.
Daniel O'Callaghon, claimant, vs. Joseph Riggs, - - - 139
3. The vessel in the hands of such purchaser is subject to the prior
lien. Ibid.
4. As the liens set up are distinct, the plaintiffs being different, neither
of these suits can be pleaded in abatement to the other. Ibid.
5. The purchaser, under the sthtute lien, could not object to the juris-
diction of the admiralty court, as the suits and rights of the parties are
distinct. Ibid.
6. It is settled that there can be no lien by the general maritime law
for materials and supplies furnished a vessel in her home port. Hill &
Conn vs. the Golden Gate, - - 142
7. The question whether a vessel is a foreign or domestic one depends
not on her enrolment, but upon the residence of her owners. Ibid.
S. Where there is a charter party, the charterers having exclusive control
of the vessel, will be deemed the owners, and alone are responsible for
damages and contracts. Ibid.
9. When the plan of a building is changed and greatly enlarged while it
is in the course of construction, the liens of mechanics and material men
subsequent to such change relate only to the commencement of the altera-
tion on the ground, and are subject to all liens which then had fastened on
the land. Smedley vs. Conway, . . . . 442
10. In the distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale, a judgment in
a scire facias on a mechanic's claim is not prima facia evidence in a contest
with other lien claimants. Ibid.
MANDAMUS.
1. It is settled that the writ of mandamus issues only where a ministerial
act is to be done, and there is no other specific remedy. It is granted only
at the discretion of the court to whom application is made. Tatham vs.
the Wardens of Philadelphia, . 878
2. By the act of 1851, the Board of Wardens, on application of the
owners of lands on the Delaware, within the limits of Philadelphia, is
bound to cause to be defined, at the expense of the applicant, the line of
low-water mark bounding their jurisdiction, nor has this duty been affected
by the consolidation act. Ibid.
3. Windmill island, in the river Delaware, opposite the city of Philadel-






1. Where an injury bappens to a servant while in the actual use of an
instrument, engine or machine, in the course of his employment, of the
nature of which he is as much aware as his master, and the use of which
is, therefore, the proximate cause of the injury, he cannot, at all events if
the evidence is consistent with his own negligence in the use of it being
the real cause, nor in case of his dying from the injury can his representa-
tive, under Lord Campbell's act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, recover against his
master, there being no evidence that the injury arose through the personal
negligence of the master. lJor is it any evidence of such personal neg-
ligence of the master that he has in use in his works an engine or machine
less safe than some other which is in general use. Dynen vs. Leach, 745
2. Therefore, where a laborer was killed through the fall of a weight
which he was raising by means of an engine to which he attached it by
INDEX. 775
fastening on to it a clip, and the clip had slipped off it, it was held that
there was no case to go to the jury in an action by his representative
against the master, although it appeared that another and safer mode of
raising the weights was usual, andhad been discarded by the orders of the
defendant. Ibid.
3. The defendant, a master builder, being engaged to repair a house,
employed one of his workmen, A., to erect the scaffoldingfor that purpose.
A. knew how to build scaffoldings. The materials which were supplied
to him by the defendant were in bad condition. The workman broke
several of the putlogs, (the pieces of wood between the wall and the
upright poles), but was ordered by the defendant not to break any more,
as they would do veiry well. The scaffolding having been erected -by A.
of the materials which were furnished to him, an accident iappened to
another workman, B., in consequence of the bad condition of the putlogs:
Held, In an action by B. to recover compensation for the injuries received,
that there was evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's
case, and that such evidence ought to have been left to thejury. Roberts
vs. Smith and another, . . . . . 750
4. A master is hound to exercise proper care and diligence in the selec-
tion of the agencies and instruments with or upon which he employs his
servants; and, if he fails to do so, he will be liable to the servant for any
injuries he may sustain therefrom. Russell T. Noyes vs. John Smith and
'William R. Lee, . . . . . . 1
5. The declaration averred that the plaintiff was bired by the defendants
to have the charge of and conduct, and run an engine, and that, by virtue
of said employment, it became the duty of defendants to-furnish an engine
that was well constructed and safe, &c., but that they carelessly and wrong-
fully furnished an insufficient engine; that the insufficiency was unknown
to the plaintiff, and 4 but for wani of all proper care and diligence, *ould
have been known to the defendants;" and that, while the plaintiff was in
the careful and prudent use of said engine, it exploded on account of said
insufficiency, and injured the plaintiff, &c. Held, on demurrer, that the
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See Master and Servant.
1. A person who came voluntarily'to assist the servants of a railway
company, doing some work on the railway, was accidently killed by the
negligence of some other servants of the company. The railway company
not having authorized the negligence, and the servahts being persons of
ordinary skill and care for the work,-Held,
First, that no action lay against the company by the personal represen-
tative of the deceased under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, and,
2. Secondly, that the above facts constituted a defence under the plea of
not guilty. Degg vs. The Midland Railway Company, - - 500
3. Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact. William P. Briggs
vs. S. W. Taylor, .. . . . . 239
4. A judge is not bound to submit to a jury questions of fact which uni-
formly result from the course of nature; this uniformity of nature becomes
a rule of law. Ibid.
5. Meaning of the phrases, "ordinary care" and "gross negligence."
Authorities cities and discussed. Ibid.
6. Any injury to property in custody of an officer under attachment,
caused by his apparent negligence or want of care, renders him prima facie
liable, and imposes upon him the burden of showing a valid excuse. Ibid.
7. The liability of railroad companies for damage caused by fire through
the negligent management of their engines, is settled at common law.
Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company vs. Hummel, - - - 244
8. But, they cannot be called upon to make compensation in advance
for the risk of fires not included within the common law rule, and no such
considerations can operate upon the viewers in fixing the amount of dam-
ages to be awarded to the land-owner. Ibid.
9. The Legislature, in requiring the viewers to take into consideration
the advantages and disadvantages resulting from any public improvement,
as a railroad, did not authorize them to enter into remote and contingent
future and speculative damage; full compensation according to the best




The action of the primary court on a motion for a new trial is not re-





















1. To render a transfer of personal property valid against creditors, it
was formerly held that there must be an immediate, open and exclusive
possession on the part of the transferree; but according to the more recent
authorities the character of the sale may be investigated as a matter of
fact, and its honesty and fairness determined by a jury. Leech vs. Shantz, 620
2. The plaintiffs, the owners of a large quantity of acid in barrels, em-
ployed certain brokers to sell it. The brokers contracted with B for the
purchase of part, and gave him an order on the plaintiffs that they should
deliver to him or his order a certain number of tons of acid. B sold his
interest in this contract to E, who sold it to L. A bought the same of L.
falsely representing himself as agent for V, and thereby, on pretence of
inspecting the acid, obtained from L, the brokers' orders on the plaintiffs
for the quantity. These orders had been endorsed over and passed from
one purchaser to another, and when delivered by L to A were endorsed by
L specially deliverable to himself. A presented the brokers' orders to the
plaintifis, and statifig that he had purchased the acid of L on his own
account, though nominally for V, induced the plaintiffs to give him a
transfer or delivery order on the wharfinger in whose warehouse the acid
was lying, authorizing the transfer into A's name of certain specific casks
of acid, amounting to the quantity in the brokers' orders mentioned. The
wharfinger thereupon transferred the gpecified casks of acid into A's name.
A immediately borrowed money of the defendant, and pledged the casks of
acid with him as a security for the repayment, handing over to the de-
fendant the warrants which he had had made out, by the means of which
the defendant obtained possession of the acid :-Held, that, as A obtained
the delivery order from the plaintiffs by the false and fraudulent repre-
sentation that he had purchased acid by a sub-sale from a purchaser from
the plaintiffs, there was no privity of contract between the plaintiffs and
A,' consequently that the latter could not convey a good title in the casks
of acid to the defendant, though a bona fide pawnee for value, but that the
plaintiffs might recover the acid back from him in trover. Kingsford and
another vs. Merry, . ... 691
PLEDGE.
1. The distinction between a pledge and a mortgage. Where B had
given G, the defendant, certain promissory notes and at the same time
delivered to him sundry certificates of Illinois State indebtedness, and
made an agreement that if the notes were unpaid at maturity, the defend-
ants were authorized to -dispose of and sell the same sixty days after the
maturity of the notes and apply the proceeds to the credit of B, held, that
this was a pledge and not a mortgage. James M. Lewis vs. John A. Gra-
ham and others, . . . . . . . 368
2. That on forfeiture for non-layment of the notes, the pledgees were
required to demand payment and give notice of the intended sale, before
sale of the securities could be made by them, so as to deprive the pledgor
of his right to redeem. ibid.
3. That demand and notice would apply only to such securities pledged
as were specially set forth in such demand, and that a sale of any pledges
without notice would be invalid. Ibid.
4. That a special partner may, under -the law in New York, purchase
securities which are sold by his partners as pledges forfeited for non-
payment of notes held by the firm. Ibid.
778 INDEX.
5. An" offer to pay notes without any actual tender of the money is suffi-
cient, if such tender would be useless by reason of the defendants having










1. A public officer, whose duty it is to arrest all persons charged with
or suspected of the commission of crime, cannot claim any other or further
remuneration for his services, than the fees allowed by law. John Rea,
Plaintiff in Error vs. Nathaniel Smith et al, - - - 98
2. Whenever an officer makes an arrest, he is supposed to be acting in
his official capacity; and where he performs the duty of sheriff, believing
he was acting within the authority derived from law, the court will not
allow him to change the relation and assume that of a private individual.
Ibid.
3. A sheriff, or any other ministerial officer, may arrest fugitives from
the justice of any other State of the Union, and detain them for a reason-
able time, until the requisition of the Executive can be made. Ibid.
4. A reward offered may be apportioned, upon equitable principles,





1. The Board of Directors of a railroad company may make rules and
regulations in relation to their business, but they must be reasonable, law-
ful, and within the limits of their charter. The establishmeot of certain
trains for the exclusive transportation of passengers and their baggage,
and other trains exclusively for the carrying of freight, is a reasonable
regulation. Merrihew s. The Milwaukee and Mississippi Railroad Com-
pany, . .. . . 864
2. A person cannot, by merely paying his fare and procuring his ticket,
as a passenger, compel a railroad company to carry him daily, together
with his trunk or trunks, when such trunk or trunks contain merchandise,








I. A riparian proprietor has the right to use the water which flows by
or throngh his lands, for all 'ordinary purposes, and for the gratification
of natural wants, even though the entire stream is thereby consumed;
and also the right to its extraordinary or artificial use, provided it is not
thereby forced back on the lands of the proprietor above him, is not unrea-
sonably and injuriously precipitated on the lands of the proprietor below,
and is restored without material diminution, before it leaves his lands, to
its accustomed channel. Stein vs. Burden. - - 729
2. If a riparian proprietor diverts the water of a running stream for
artificial purposes, in quantities sufficient to affect injuriously the rights
of the proprietor below him, and does not restore it to its natural channel,
without material diminution, before it reaches the lands of that proprie-
tor, he is liable in damages for the injury; and that the means provided
by him for its restoration are rendered inefficient for that purpose, after
the water has left his land, by the act or inteference of a third person,
though it might mitigate the damages, is no excuse for the failure, since
the right to divert it is only conditional, and ceases when the water can-
not be restored. (Rice, C. J., dissenting.) Did.
3. There are no correlative rights existing between the proprietors of
adjoining lands, in reference to the use of the water in the earth, or perco-
lating under its surface. Such water is to be regarded as part of the land
itself, to be enjoyed absolutely by the proprietor within whose territory it
is ; and to it the law governing the use of running streams is inapplicable.
Lewis Chatfield vs. Walter M. Wilson. - - - - 528
4. An act legal in itself, and which violates no right, cannot be made
actionable on account of the motive which induces it. Ibid.
5. Although the ebb and flow of the tide was, at common law, the most
usual test of navigability, it was not necessarily the only one. M'Manus
vs. Carmichael. 593
6. But hoivever this may be, that test is not applicable to the Missis-
sippi river. Ibid.
7. The common law consequences of navigability, attach to the legal
navigability of the Mississippi. Ibid.
8. The term navigable, embraces'within itself, not merely the idea that
theowaters could be navigated, but also the idea of publicity, so that say-
ing waters are public, is equivalent, in a legal sense, to saying that they
are navigable. Ibid.
9. Yet the navigability, in fact, is the leading idea, and is the ground of
their publicity. Ibid.
10. The ebb and flow of the tide does n6t, in reality, make the waters navi-
gable, nor has it, in the essence of the thing, anything to do with it. Ibid.
11. It is navigability in fact, which forms the foundation for navigability
in law, and from the fact, follows the appropriation to public use, and
hence its publicity and legal navigability. Ibid.
12. The reAl test of navigability in this country, is ascertained by use
or by public act or declaration. Rbid.
13. The acts und declarations of the United States declare and consti-
tute the Mississippi rivera public highway, in the highest and broadest
intendment possible. Ibid.
14. The rule that a grant is to be construed most strongly against the
grantor, does not apply to public grants. Ibid.
15. The government being but a trustee for the public, its grants are to
be construed strictly. Ibid.
16. Grants of land by the United States, by patent, have relation to the
survey plats, and field notes. Ibid.
17. The common law knows but two lines-the medium filum aguee and
high water. If the stream be navigable, the boundary of the adjoining
land is the one; if not navigable, the boundary is the other. RIbd.
18. By the common law, the riparian proprietor on navigable waters,
















1. The parent, as such, has no direct remedy at common law for the
seduction of a daughter. He has to resort therefor to what has been
denominated "but little more than matter of fiction "-the relation of
master and servant assumed to exist between parent and child-in order
to redress this wrong. Two distinct actions, it is true, are submitted to
his option, but both have relation to this hypothesis of loss of service,
upon which they are dependent-in the one case, as matter in the aggra-
vation of damages; and, in the other, as the very gist of the action itself.
Marcus C. Parker vs. Rebecca Meek, Sr. . . . . 493
2. In the action of trespass vi et armis for debauching a daughter, the
gravamen is the illegal entry of the seducer upon the parent's premises;
and the seduction itself, and consequent loss of service, may be averred and
proven in aggravation of damages. In an action on the case for the same
injury, the gravamen is the consequential injuries arising from the seduc-
tion, in loss of service to the parent. In the first action, it is essential that
the daughter, whether of full age or not, should have been upon the parent's
premises at the time of the seduction; in the latter, whatever be the age
of the daughter, it is immaterial when the wrong was perpetrated, so that
she reside with the parent some portion of the time of her pregnancy, or of
her lying in. Ibid.
3. In actions for seduction, proof of menial services by the daughter to
the parent is not necessary. Evidence of the most trifling and valueless
acts of service is sufficient. Indeed, it seems that the fact that the daughter
lived with the parent for a time during the period of pregnancy and par-
turition, is of itself sufficient to raise a presumption of service. This,
however, may be rebutted by proof that she lived with the parent as
boarder, or in some other relation than that of mere child or servant. Ibid.
4. If the daughter lived with the mother before and at the time the
child was born, performing service for her, the mother had a legal right to
maintain an action of case for the seduction, although the father, who
bad died before the birth of the child, 'as living at the time of the seduc-
tion. Ibid.
SERVANT.























1. It is the settled rule in the law of stoppage in transitu that movable
property sold but not paid for, may, on the discovery of the vendee's in-
solvency before it has come into his possession, be seized by the vendor.
Charles B. Campbell et al. v. Robert B. Cabeen, et al., garnishees, 688
2. Where A. shipped blooms to Philadelphia, consigning them to B. &
Co. with written instructions to deliver them "to the order of C.," and they
were so received and 85 pieces forwarded to C., who subsequently became
insolvent, the right of stoppage in transitu in A. is gone, inasmuch as the
transit was completely at an end when the blooms reached B. & Co., who
held them subject to C.'s orders and as his agents; and D. may issue



























When the complaint alleges that the defendant wrongfully diverted
the water, while the evidence shows that, though the water was originally
diverted by him, he provided means for its return to its natural channel
above plaintiff's lands, and that its return was prevented by the act of
another person after it left defendant's land, there is no material variance
between the allegations and proof. (Rice, C. J., disenting.) Stein vs.
Burden, - - - 729
VENDOR.












A testator wrote his will, and signed it in the presence of two persons
summoned by him for the purpose; they took the will into an adjoining
room to sign their names; the rooms communicated by a door, which was
left open. There was no proof that the testator did actually see the wit-
nesses sign their names: Held, that the signature of the witnesses was not






See Master and Servant.
